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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ADAMS COUNTY, an Idaho County,
Appellant
VS.

DALE LATTIN and KATHLEEN LATTIN, husband and wife, et. a1
Respondents

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Adams County
Honorable Judge Drescher presiding
ADAMS COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, P.O. Box 546, Council, ID 83612,
Richard T. Roats, Residing in Boise, Idaho, for Appellant
PICKENS LAW, P.A. P.O. Box 915, Boise, ID 83701,
Terri Rae Pickens, Residing in Boise, Idaho, for Respondents
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I. A GENUINE
ISSUEOF MATERIAL
FACTEXISTSREGARDING
WHETHER
THE ROAD
WAS ACQUIRED
THROUGI* PRESCRIPTION
A. Validation Proceedings are Not Required
Respondents incorrectly state that "the commissioners were obligated to follow
the procedures set forth in Idaho Code Section 40-203." Resp't Bv. 11. The plain
language of 5 40-203A contradicts their contention.
(I) Any resident or property holder within a county or highway
district system, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or
any agency of the federal government, g x i ~petition the board of county
or highway district commissioners, whichever shall have jurisdiction of
the highway system, to initiate public proceedings to validate a highway
or public right-of-way, including those which furnish public access to state
and federal public lands and waters, provided that the petitioner shall pay
a reasonable fee as determined by the commissioners to cover the cost of
the proceedings, or the commissioners may initiate validation
proceedings. . .
(2) If proceedings for validation of a highway or public right-of-way
are initiated, the cominissioners shall follow the procedure set forth in
section 40-203 . . .
Nothing in these sections required Appellants to engage the validation
proceedings. It is clear that the procedures in section 203 apply only when validation
proceedings have been initiated, and Respondents admit that "Appellants never initiated
validation proceedings . . . ,"rendering their argument irrelevant. Resp 't BP:12.
The relevant requirements for establishing a public right of way are identified in
Idaho Code

5 202(3), which makes no mention of validation proceedings.

It states that

"all highways used for a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked
and kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of
commissioners, are highways." This section does llot require engagement of validation
proceedings in order to establish a road's "highway" status. Instead, it simply requires

that the road be used for five years and worked and kept up at the expense of the public.
There is absolutely no merit to Respondents' argument that validation proceedings are an
essential element for proving a road's highway status. The validation proceedings serve
only as one method by which a road can be confirmed as a highway through five years of
use.
For example, as an alternative, one could confirm that a road is a highway through
an action to quiet title under Idaho Code $ 6-401. In fact, Respondents did exactly that,
and if the lower court had found in the County's favor, then the road's highway status
would be confirmed though that procedure - a procedure that had nothing to do with the
validation process. The lower court, however, erroneously concluded that the validation
proceedings must be followed, and therefore found in Respondents' favor. However, the
fact that validation proceedings may be followed does not yield the conclusion that they
must be. As explained below, Appellant satisfied the requirements for establishing a
public highway, which should have been sufficient to quiet title in the County's favor.
For that reason the lower court erred.

B. Maintenance at Public Expense May not Necessarilv be Required
State v. Berg established that in order to establish a right of way by prescription,
"it is not necessary for the county to do work upon a road that does not need work to keep
it in repair or to put it in condition for the public to travel." 28 Idaho 724, 726 (1916).
Respondents failed to distinguish Berg in any meaningful fashion. The fact that

&

was a criminal case does not negate the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court was deciding
the issue of whether a road had bee11 acquired through prescription. The substantive issue
in Berg was identical to the substantive issue here. Secondly, the fact that the statute has

been amended several times since 1916 does not negate the fact that the substance of the
statute in 1916 was identical to the statute today. The actual statutory language in 1916'
is almost indistinguishable from the language today. Berg remains controlling Supreme
Court precedent.
Moreover, Berg's logic was sound. It essentially held that, if a road does not
require expenditures for its upkeep, the11 the public needn't expend money in order for a
road to be "worked and kept up at the expense of the public." If a road does not require
upkeep, then the public expense of lnaintaining the road is zero dollars. So, a road could
be "kept up" at the public's expense, but it would just so happen that the expense to the
public would be nonexistent.
On this issue, the County proffered sufficient evidence to overcome summary
judgment. As Appellants explained in the opening brief, the public actually used the road
for over one hundred years. No countervailing evidence was offered to suggest that
someone other than the public maintained the road. Given this evidence, a reasonable
persoil could conclude that no maintenance was necessary for the upkeep of the road. If
no maintenance was necessary, then there would be no cost to the public for the road's
upkeep. As a result, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the road was "kept up at
the expense of the public." This is especially true given that the County need only meet
a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Floyd v. Bd. Oof Comm'rs of Bonneville

-,

137 Idaho 718, 724 (2002). Therefore, summary judgment was improperly

granted.

'

"[A111 roads used as such for a period of five years, provided the later shall have been
worked and kept up at the expense of the public or located and recorded by order of the
board of commissioners, are highways."

11. AN ISSUEOF FACTEXISTS
REGARDENG
THE DEDICATION
OF THE ROAD
"The elements of a common law dedication are (1) an offer by the owner clearly
and unequivocally indicating an intent to dedicate the land and (2) an acceptance of the
offer." Armand v. Opportunity Management Co., Inc., 141 Idaho 709, 714 (2005). The
filing of a subdivision plat satisfies the offer requirement if done clearly and
unequivocally.

Id. The commissioners obviously accepted the offer by

approving the

plat. Appellant's Opening Brief explains why Old Sawmill Road should be considered a
right of way, and Respondents' only meaningful response was to claim that contract
principles of interpretation should not apply to interpretation of the plat. However, those
principles apply for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of a document. It would be
logically inconsistent for this Court to claiin that interpretive principles are effective in
ascertaining the meaning of contracts (as well as the meaning of statutes, for that matter),
but ineffective in ascertaining the meaning of plats. Old Sawmill Road is a right of way,
dedicated to the public long ago.

111. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the lower court's grant of
summary judgment.

Respectfully Submitted this

1C

day of September, 2009.

Richard T. Roats
Attorney for Appellant

